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THE RIGHT To BE LET ALONE

The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. 1
Justice Brandeis saw the Constitution as conferring a substantive right that is both the most comprehensive, and the most valued, of
any in the document. What is this remarkable right? In the narrow
context of United States v. Olmstead, it appears to be the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure. But
Brandeis made a very similar argument in many of the same words
thirty years earlier in a very famous and influential law journal article. 2 In this earlier context, the right is specifically identified as the
right to privacy. In both the law journal, where the focus was on the
development of civil protection of privacy, and the constitutional case
dealing with the Fourth Amendment, Brandeis characterized privacy
in Judge Cooley's terms - the right to be let alone. What do we mean
by a right to be let alone?
Except for a few very eccentric, and sometimes dangerous, individuals, no one desires to be let entirely alone. Humans need friends,
family, and social interaction. Life, liberty, property, and happiness all
depend on deeply complex social, commercial, legal, and moral interactions. A "culture" of hermits and recluses is the last thing civilized
men and women would desire. But, of course, Justice Brandeis knew
this all along. The right to be let alone was never imagined to be a
normative directive to let individuals totally alone. It articulates a
value in letting people alone, in certain kinds of ways and in limited
contexts. The exact ways people are entitled to be let alone, and the
1.
2.
1891).

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890-
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precise contexts in which this entitlement is held, are the subjects of
great moral, legal, and constitutional controversy.
In addition to his provocative identification of privacy with an
entitlement to be let alone, Justice Brandeis makes a comparative assertion. Not only is an individual's interest in personal and
constitutional privacy identified as a right, it is given pride of place as
the most comprehensive and valued of rights. 3 This seems unlikely;
privacy is not, nor has it ever been, the most valued of possible rights.
Sadly, most citizens don't think enough about moral or legal rights to
have an opinion one way or another. Those who do are as likely to
identify the Second Amendment, or a collective community right to law
and order, as the most valuable legal right. Even as thoughtful and
distinguished a jurist as Justice Black expressed an almost dismissive
evaluation of the importance of privacy:
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though
there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any
law ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" of individuals. But there is not ....
I like my privacy as well as the next one,
but I am compelled to admit that government has a right to invade
4
it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.
Justice Brandeis' concerns were neither empirical nor ethnographic. His extraordinary claim is a normative one: privacy is a
central, and perhaps essential, value in a genuinely liberal society. I
think he is quite correct in this judgment. This remains bitterly controversial, however, not just because all normative and academic
theses are controversial, but because we have such a fragile and imperfect understanding of the nature of personal and legal privacy, and an
equally unclear vision of its social, legal, and moral importance. An
entitlement to be let alone is an intriguing normative directive in a
liberal society, but one that raises as many questions as it answers. In
what sense are citizens entitled to be let alone? Who must leave them
alone? In what circumstances must they be left alone? An adequate
theory of privacy must provide at least the bare outlines to these basic
questions. Further, assuming we can reach some consensus about the
nature of privacy, there remain difficult questions about the sacrifices
society can be expected to make in order to respect individual privacy.
Honoring personal privacy exacts a very real social cost. How can we
ever engage in the reflective balancing of the costs and benefits of pro3. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("They conferred, as against
the government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.").
4. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509-10 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
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tecting privacy when we have such a sketchy understanding of its
place in the larger array of values and rights in contemporary liberal
society?
My hope in the discussion to follow is at the same time unrealistically ambitious and cautiously modest. The modesty comes from the
fact that I advocate no significant legal or conceptual change, and because, though I have strong feelings and make no special attempt to
disguise them, I in no way see my own substantive views as any kind of
logical outgrowth of my analysis of the substantive moral, legal, and
constitutional questions surrounding privacy. The ambition comes
from the conceit of offering yet another model or analysis of personal
and legal privacy. Over fifty years ago, Judge Biggs colorfully described the privacy literature as "a haystack in a hurricane." 5 The
ensuing decades have seen a profusion of scholarly attention, and
many new competing definitions, but nothing remotely resembling consensus. I put forward an analysis of privacy here that is "mine" only in
the sense that I take the credit and blame for the particular articulation and argumentative defense before you. I believe that this analysis
is implicit, and sometimes explicit, in the work of a number of scholars.
I am confident that it is conceptually superior to competing models, but
I have no illusions that it possesses some kind of magical analytic clarity that will immediately win over advocates for rival understandings
of privacy. My hope is that the community of scholars toiling in the
fields of privacy will find some use for a somewhat systematic examination of recent developments, and for a concrete proposal for
consideration and review.
II.

SEMANTIC LEGISLATION

Defining privacy requires a familiarity with its ordinary usage, of
course, but this is not enough since our common ways of talking and
using language are riddled with inconsistencies, ambiguities, and
paradoxes. What we need is a definition which is by and large consistent with ordinary language, so that capable speakers of English
will not be genuinely surprised that the term "privacy" should be
defined in this way, but which also enables us to talk consistently,
clearly, and
precisely about the family of concepts to which privacy
6
belongs.
Since its very beginnings as a written discipline, philosophy has
been fundamentally concerned with the analysis of thought and lan5.
6.

Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Co., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3rd Cir. 1956).
W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 4, 258 (1983).
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guage. This often leads to the caricature that philosophers only care
about words, which is not true, of course. We want to understand the
nature of a concept like privacy, not because we want to compile new
dictionary entries, but because we care about privacy, and laws and
public policies that may enhance or threaten our privacy. But some
better understanding of privacy seems required for an informed and
productive debate about those laws and public policies. It is hard to
see how such conceptual improvement could come about without careful scholarly attention by philosophers, social scientists, and academic
lawyers.
Natural language is at times vague, ambiguous, and unclear.
Speakers misuse language. Occasionally what appears to be a substantive dispute turns out to be nothing more than a simple linguistic
misunderstanding. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that scholars
professionally trained to pay attention to language grow impatient and
advocate linguistic reform and greater linguistic care. The concept of
privacy seems a natural one for this sort of conceptual revision. In the
quote above, W.A. Parent is unapologetic in his call for a more precise
definition of privacy.
Let us assume that Professor Parent's call for linguistic reform
is more than a rhetorical voice. 7 He is concerned, as are many privacy
scholars, with rampant inconsistency, ambiguity, and paradox in the
colloquial and legal usage of the concept of privacy. He proposes,
therefore, a reformed definition of privacy that eliminates contradictory wordings and resolves vague and ambiguous usages into clear and
precise ones. I am convinced that this sort of semantic legislation, no
matter how well intentioned or easily sympathized with, is a futile
philosophical undertaking. There is clear value, of course, in scrupulously calling attention to ambiguity, vagueness, and contradiction. If
the concept of privacy is guilty of these conceptual sins (and I suspect
most every interesting concept is to some degree), then there is an analytic obligation to point them out and perhaps even to suggest ways of
dealing with the problems. But taking language that is widely used in
inconsistent or ambiguous ways, or concepts that admit of borderline
cases, and artificially redefining them by mandating new, consistent,
univocal, and precise usage is a waste of philosophical time and effort.
Linguistic usage is certainly malleable. But conceptual change
is the product of generations of gradually evolving linguistic habits, not
an abrupt, overnight cessation of old ways of thinking and speaking,
and the adoption of new philosophically mandated ones to replace
7.

Id.
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them. I claim as a simple matter of empirical fact that such immediate
linguistic change is psychologically and anthropologically impossible.
This fact, alone, must raise serious doubts about the whole approach of
semantic legislation as a way of understanding philosophical analysis.
Perhaps even more problematic for this perspective, however, is
that semantic legislation would typically prove to be normatively futile. The problem here is that philosophical analysis of normative
concepts like privacy rarely takes place independently of larger political and moral questions. Definitions of privacy are often used as
premises in arguments for social and legal policies. The debates about
these policies are always contentious. Any recommended conceptual
"improvement" will be readily embraced by partisans whose position
will be enhanced by the proposed semantic legislation. Those on the
opposite side, however, if they have their wits about them, will reject
the proposal as not being an improvement at all, but rather as beggingthe-question against them. The existing substantive debate will find
itself recast as a conceptual disagreement. This is unfortunate, not
simply because it will prove to be every bit as controversial as the original policy dispute, but also because it actually mischaracterizes the
real nature of the fight and thus makes it even less likely that the opposing positions can find room for compromise, let alone resolution.
III.

INFORMATION MODELS OF PRIVACY

"Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others."8
A.

Privacy and Information

In a body of literature that is often characterized as a completely lacking scholarly consensus, one finds surprising agreement
concerning the centrality of information to the concept of personal privacy. Although there is an initial plausibility to the claim that
epistemological concepts like information, data, and knowledge form
the analytic core of privacy, I contend that privacy should be understood in a very different fashion. One part of my argument will show
that there are many standard uses of privacy where informational concerns are either completely absent, or can only be included in artificial
and contrived ways. I concede that there are many other instances,
8.

ALAN

F.

WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM

7 (Atheneum Press 1967).
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however, where information does seem to be center stage. My strategy,
here, will be to suggest that although in these latter cases information
and privacy are connected, the linkage is contingent and neither analytically nor normatively central.
The following is an example of a recent theory of privacy that
received some scholarly attention in the 1980s. I intend to be brutally
harsh on it, but I must confess at the outset that it has great initial
plausibility, and certainly possesses the theoretical virtues of clarity
and elegance. Nevertheless, I believe it can be shown to be conclusively false. Perhaps falsity is an inappropriate charge, since Parent is
candidly involved in semantic legislation. Still, since he admits desiring a theory that is "by and large consistent with ordinary language,"
and one that "enables us to talk clearly and precisely about the family
of concepts to which privacy belongs," 9 I think it is fair to submit the
theory to the challenge of potential counter-examples.
Privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal
knowledge of one possessed by others. A person's privacy is diminished exactly to the degree that others possess this kind of
knowledge about him.... [Plersonal information ...[should] be
understood to consist of facts about a person which most individuals in a given society do not want widely known about themselves. 10
As admirably clear as this model first appears, there are at
least four components that demand further clarification. Parent uses
the concepts of knowledge and information as virtually synonymous.
In colloquial speech this reasonable enough, but in most philosophical
contexts there are distinctions that deserve at least some mention.
Facts are impersonal, and although the data exists, it is quite possible
that no one is aware of it. I may "possess" a good deal of information
about climate conditions in South America by owning a handy-dandy
computer encyclopedia, though I never consult the relevant entries.
The F.B.I. may possess a good deal of data about you in one of their
seldom-accessed files. Knowledge, however, is a much more dynamic
epistemological concept. According to what is sometimes called the
standard analysis, to know something is to believe it, and to have good
evidence for it, and for it to be true." For Parent's model, as well as
many of the other information models, it is unclear whether information or knowledge is the real concern. Has the F.B.I. violated your
privacy if it has lots of data about you, but never accesses it? Does
9. Parent, supra note 6, at 269.
10. Id. at 270.
11. Edmund Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, in
(P. K. Moser & A. Vander Nat, eds., Oxford Press 1995).

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 273
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access by data entry change the answer? Every one of us, even the
most radical privacy hawks, would care more if the inappropriate personal data was known - thought about, considered, believed, et cetera,
by others - than if it was just mechanically compiled. This should alert
us to something important, I believe.
Privacy, according to Parent, protects personal information.
His working definition of personal information is a helpful blend of example and generalized conceptual description.
In contemporary America facts about a person's sexual preferences,
drinking or drug habits, income, the state of his or her marriage
and health belong to the class of personal information. Ten years
from now some of these facts may be a part of everyday conversation; if so their disclosure would not diminish individual privacy.
[is] a function of existing cultural norms
[Personal information...
12
and social practices.
This seems right so far, but it is followed by a surprising addition to
the category of personal information. While at first the addition just
seems eccentric, I believe is symptomatic of a more serious conceptual
malady.
[We must] accommodate a particular and unusual class of cases of
the following sort. Most of us don't care if our height, say, is widely
known. But there are a few persons who are extremely sensitive
about their height (or weight or voice pitch). They might take extreme measures to ensure that other people do not find it out. For
such individuals height is a very personal matter. Were someone to
we should not hesitate to talk
find it out by ingenious snooping
13
about an invasion of privacy.
I think we would, indeed, describe this example as an invasion of privacy, but not because the information has idiosyncratically become
personal, but rather because there has been ingenious, and we assume
inappropriate, snooping. Once again we have advance warning that
something besides information is at work in our concerns with personal privacy.
Finally we come to the last, and least plausible, part of Parent's
model. As with most aspects of this analysis, there is complete candor
and philosophical purpose to its inclusion.
My definition of privacy excludes knowledge of documented personal information. I do this for a simple reason. Suppose that A is
browsing through some old newspapers and happens to see B's
name in a story about child prodigies who unaccountably failed to
12.

Parent, supra note 6, at 270.

13.

Id.
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succeed as adults. Should we accuse A of invading B's privacy? No.
An affirmative answer blurs the distinction between the public and
the private. What belongs to the public domain cannot without
it should not be inglaring paradox be called private; consequently
14
corporated within our concept of privacy.
I confess here to a simple intuitive disagreement. I believe that the
adolescent games engaged in by Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky
were none of our business. I think that their inclusion in the special
prosecutor's report was a violation of privacy. Grant me the above, as
they say, for the sake of argument. Doesn't it continue to violate their
privacy every time their behavior is referred to again in the tabloids, or
the evening news, or in monologues on late-night TV? Parent's category of undocumented personal information seems to put a kind of
statute of limitations on violations of privacy. Suppose I surreptitiously take a digital photo of you and your mistress. I take it that we
are agreed I have violated your privacy. When I post it on my
webpage, I have further violated your privacy. Is the picture now fair
game? Is it permissible, now, for others to forward it indiscriminately?
Maybe my webpage is obscure and rarely accessed, but Jane Smith's is
prestigious and everybody clicks in. Doesn't Smith further violate your
privacy, perhaps even more seriously than I did, when she uploads the
photo onto her site? The issues raised here are more subtle than the
simple dismissal that "what belongs to the public domain cannot without glaring paradox be called private."
Most introductory logic books contain ordinary language paraphrases for the sentential connectives in the first-order propositional
calculus. The relationship of bi-conditionality that we typically see in
the classical form of conceptual analysis is indicated in colloquial
speech by the phrases "if and only if," or "just in case." I know of no
introductory book that includes the phrase "exactly to the degree that."
I am assuming, nevertheless, that Parent intends this strong logical
connection. His model of personal privacy, then, can be reconstructed
as follows.
A's privacy is violated by B if:
" B possesses personal knowledge (or information) about A (without A's consent), and
" The personal knowledge about A is undocumented.
This model possesses many conceptual virtues - relative clarity, simplicity, and perhaps even initial plausibility. Its biggest vice,
unfortunately, is that it seriously mischaracterizes the nature and im14.

Id. at 270-71.
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I will use the method of counter-

Three Kinds of Counter-Examples

I will present three distinct sorts of counter-examples to Parent's model of personal privacy. Any one of these would be adequate
for the narrow task of demonstrating the model's inadequacy, of
course, but it is interesting to see the different ways each fails to capture some of our deepest feelings about privacy. My ultimate goal is to
suggest that these categories of counter-examples pose profound explanatory hurdles for any type of information-based analysis of
privacy, and may even prove useful in pointing the way to more plausible accounts of the concept.
The first class of cases involves failed attempts to uncover information, including undocumented personal information. Let's say you
and I are both candidates for the position of department chair. You
suspect that I engage in unprofessional conduct with female students
in the privacy of my office, and that by documenting it to the Dean you
can sabotage my candidacy. You bribe the custodian, gain access to my
office late one night, and install hidden microphones and video cameras. But you have bad luck - in the two weeks you monitor my office,
I contract the flu and never make it in to work. The job is announced,
neither of us gets it, and you remove the equipment before I recover
and return to school. According to Parent's model, you do not violate
my privacy by your actions. After all, you clearly do not possess undocumented personal information about me. You do know that I
haven't been into work, but that information is not personal, and is
well-documented with all of our colleagues. You possess data about
how messy my office is, but again, that's not particularly personal, and
is so well-documented within the campus community that I am famous
for my untidy ways. Have you perhaps simply attempted to violate my
privacy, but failed? Your devious plan is certainly a spectacular failure, but you have succeeded, beautifully, in violating my privacy. It
would be far too easy on you to allow you to plead to the lesser moral
charge of merely attempting to violate my privacy. I know of no way of
establishing this clear intuition on my part other than asking you to
imagine yourself as the victim. Supposing that you somehow find out
about the surveillance, isn't your outrage that of someone who has actually been harmed and not that of someone who has luckily avoided
it?
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The second class of counter-examples seeks to even more drastically sever the connection between privacy and information. You are
my research assistant. I believe that you have great academic promise,
and I also presume to know you well enough to make judgments about
your future happiness. You tell me of your plans to delay your dissertation and get married. I am convinced that the guy is a loser and that
you will be terribly unhappy; I am also devastated that you would potentially abandon such bright academic prospects. Though many
might disagree, I do not believe that it would be a violation of your
privacy for me to share my misgivings with you as a friend and mentor.
But suppose I just can't let go of it. I continually lecture you on what a
mistake you are about to make, how you are throwing away your future, and how miserable you will be. Surely, now, I have intruded on
things that are "none of my business."
I am convinced that this is a very central case of violating someone's privacy. A focus on knowledge or information alone, however,
seems to completely miss the normative point. It is true, of course,
that you could have protected yourself from my meddling by keeping
your plans secret. There is what we might call an empirical link between personal privacy and blocks on information and knowledge in
many cases like the above. If you hide your plans from me, keep them
secret, treat them as confidential, you will no doubt spare yourself from
my butting in. But the violation of your privacy is not what I know, or
data that I have come to possess. It is what I do. I violate your privacy
by being a presumptuous busybody.
The last class of counter-examples explores the delicate topics of
sexuality and nudity. More than one privacy scholar has commented
on the archaic sounding expression "private parts" as a euphemism for
genitals. Our bodies, particularly in states of undress, as well as our
sex lives, are preeminent areas of personal privacy. Yet, information
models totally miss the point of the privacy concerns associated with
sexuality, excretion, and nudity. Consider the following two examples
from the recent literature. First from Julie Inness:
[W]hen a peeping Tom looks in a person's window for the second
time, it is conceivable that he might acquire absolutely no new information about the victim. Despite this failure, the peeping Tom
clearly violates the victim's privacy with the second, as well as the
first, inspection. When he is charged with the second violation, he
cannot escape with the explanation, "I've seen it all before!" 15
15.
1992).

JULIE

INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY,

AND

ISOLATION

64 (Oxford University Press
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And, a second from Judith DeCew: "[c]onsider a man who knows his
wife's body very well but is now divorced from her and spying on her as
she takes a bath. It is difficult to deny that her privacy is being
16
invaded."
The power of these little counter-examples seems to derive from
the fact that "knowledge" of the appearance of the victim's body is in
some sense "documented." Since Parent's analysis explicitly includes
the condition that the "information" be undocumented, they constitute
profound, and I would argue, fatal, problems for the model. I would go
further, however. What about Inness's voyeur on his first visit to his
victim's window? Surely he has violated her privacy. Has he gained
undocumented personal information? Perhaps, but I suggest that any
information or knowledge is completely incidental to the offense, and
that it totally misrepresents the victim's concern. She cares that the
privacy of her home has been compromised and that she has been
stared at in a state of undress, not that something secret or confidential has been discovered. Thus, I am pressing the point that cases of
voyeurism count as serious counter-examples to Parent's analysis
quite independently of the number of times one has been victimized.
C. More Modest Information Models of Privacy
An attack on a very specific conceptual model can be a cowardly
strategy. So what if the precise formulation suggested by Parent can
be shown to be inadequate? The philosophical critic earns some small
analytical points by systematically marshaling her counter-examples,
but does this in any way show that the initial idea is conceptually
flawed? Many scholars, perhaps even a majority of them, have seen
some analytical link between the concepts of information and privacy.
The more interesting analyses attempt to articulate this connection in
more modest and plausible forms. Consider, for example, the following
from Richard Wasserstrom.
It is apparent that there are a number of different claims that can
be made in the name of privacy. A number - and perhaps all - of
them involve the question of the kind and degree of control that a
person ought to be able to exercise in respect to knowledge or the
disclosure of information about himself or herself. That is not all
there is to privacy, but it is surely one central theme. 1 7
16.

JUDITH DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY

34 (Cornell University Press 1997).

17. Richard Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions,
PhilosophicalLaw (Richard Bronaugh ed., Greenwood Press 1978).

in
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Is information even analytically central to the concept of privacy? If the literature is to be trusted, the consensus must be an
unqualified yes. And to the degree that the intuitions of casual speakers are relevant, the answer is again in the affirmative. Perhaps,
therefore, it is nothing more than an exercise in semantic legislation to
quarrel with such widespread agreement. Still, I see no escape from
the fact that the analysis so far shows that there remain central cases
of gross violations of privacy that have little or nothing to do with
information.
This is clearest in cases like the overbearing mentor. The research assistant's decisions about marriage, her education, and
perhaps her career are none of his business. His initial advice may
have been appropriate, but his incessant lecturing is clearly wrong.
The normative breach in these kinds of cases has nothing to do with
knowledge, but with attempts to influence certain kinds of decisions
and behavior. These sorts of intrusions into people's lives constitute a
very serious violation of personal privacy.
Very similar considerations explain why we so naturally describe formal actions on the part of institutions and government that
restrict choice as violations of privacy. When the law presumes to restrict the use of contraceptive devices it intrudes on individuals'
privacy: "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision to bear or beget a child."18
We have already seen that information is related to these sorts
of privacy violations in a contingent manner. If the research assistant
keeps her plans secret, she effectively blocks the intrusion from her
mentor. If single and married individuals only clandestinely obtain
and use birth control devices, they have little to fear from government.
But even this concedes too much to information analyses. Why should
the graduate student have to keep her plans secret? Indeed, she
wanted to share the exciting news with her mentor. The Connecticut
and Massachusetts laws in Griswold1 9 and Eisenstadt 20 make this
point even more directly. Why should married or single individuals
have to take any risk of being caught, or suffer the inconvenience of the
black market to secure their contraceptives? Government has no business in this aspect of a person's life.
18.

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).

19.

Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.

20.

Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438.
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I have already argued that the very complex, and clearly socially constructed, conventions regarding sexuality, nudity, and the
like cannot be adequately captured by the concepts of information and
knowledge. Any treatment of these issues in purely informational
terms simply places an unrealistic emphasis on the sensory nature of
the violation. It is true that sensory modalities are our primary, if not
only, means of acquiring information. It is equally true that the
voyeur, or the pervert who listens in as you and your lover engage in
sex, depends upon his senses for his cheap thrills. But the goal of the
watching or listening is not informational, and the offense felt by the
victims has nothing to do with any potential knowledge that might be
illegitimately gained.
The force of these examples is very different than when they
were first applied to Parent's model. The modest approach is not committed to information being logically necessary or sufficient for the
concept of privacy. The counter-examples, therefore, do not refute the
model. They do pose, however, what I will call "explanatory hurdles."
Information is hypothesized as a central, indeed the central, analytic
component in privacy. Yet there are at least two sorts of standard privacy violations that have little, if anything, to do with knowledge or
information. This has to give at least some pause for thought.
D. Information and the Judgment of Others
Perhaps the virtues of information models can only truly be appreciated by focusing on the admittedly numerous cases where privacy
and the control of personal information do seem to take center stage.
Let us turn our attention to some instances of privacy that seem to
intrinsically involve epistemological concepts of knowledge and information. Most of us in this culture consider facts and data about the
following aspects of our lives very personal and private:
"
"
"
"
"
"

Our health and medical records
Our finances
Lifestyle choices such as our use of drugs and alcohol
Details about our closest personal relationships
Almost any occurrences within the "privacy" of our homes
Creative endeavors like poetry or painting

We may, of course, voluntarily choose to share this personal information with others - the finance company when we apply for a loan,
guests invited into our homes, or our paintings when they are displayed at the county fair. But the choice is ours; we are entitled to

2007

IMMUNITY FROM FOCUSEDATTENTION

block others from having this knowledge about us, and to feel profound
moral and legal outrage when they illegitimately come to possess it.
It is indeed natural to describe the privacy concerns
above in
informational terms. I have been arguing for three decades, however,
that information and knowledge are not our "real" concerns. 2 1 To take
a couple of examples from the little laundry list above: I desire to shelter information about my drinking, lest you consider me a drunk; my
poetry is confidential, since I have no desire to be laughed at. My general thesis has been that there is an obvious empirical connection
between information and judgment. On the basis of personal information (both reliable and unreliable), others may form judgments about
us. Perhaps the most effective way of ensuring that others do not illegitimately judge us is to block their access to personal information.
Thus, I claim, in a world where individuals were truly granted a limited and culturally defined immunity from the judgment of others, we
would have little, if any, concern about others possessing information
about us within this limited sphere of our lives.
The immunity from the judgment of others hypothesis nicely
captures our privacy concerns with respect to government. The Fourth
Amendment grants us immunity from the judgment of the state with
respect to our persons, houses, papers, and effects. Rather than warrants and probable cause providing shields that allow for criminal
activity, the Fourth Amendment protects the innocent, honorable, and
law-abiding. We are all granted immunity from government's moral
and legal judgment within these most private aspects of our personal
environment. In addition, we are granted immunity from judgment
with respect to certain personal decisions and actions. It was none of
the overbearing mentor's business what his research assistant decided
to do with her life. Recent constitutional law has similarly recognized
that it is none of government's business what citizens decide to do with
respect to birth control, unwanted pregnancies, or consensual adult
sexual encounters. 2 2 Many of us believe, though the Supreme Court
has yet to agree, that it is none of government's business what the gender of citizens desiring to marry is, or choices to end one's life in the
face of medical considerations. Here it is very clear, I believe, that our
privacy concerns are not with government having knowledge that we
21. Jeffery L. Johnson, Privacy and the Judgment of Others, 23 J. VALUE INQUIRY 157,
158-68 (1989). See also Jeffrey L. Johnson, A Theory of the Nature and Value of Privacy, 6
PuB. AFF. Q. 271-88 (1992), and Jeffery L. Johnson, Constitutional Privacy, LAw AND
PHILOSOPHY 13, 161-93 (1994).

22. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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have secured an abortion, are seeking homosexual marriage, or exercised our right to die, but that we insist that government not judge us,
that it not criminalize or prohibit these personal choices and behavior.
The judgment of others hypothesis has the advantage of changing the focus from the passive epistemological states of others, to the
much more active affective cognitive states of others. Most of us immediately recognize how discomforting it can be to be judged by others in
those limited contexts where we expect immunity. I remain confident,
therefore, that the immunity from the judgment of others account is
explanatorily superior to information models in many contexts and
does a much better job of uncovering the source of our own reactions to
violations of our privacy.
Unfortunately, many of the examples I have brought to bear
against information models apply with almost equal force to the immunity from the judgment of others approach. There is nothing
intrinsically judgmental about voyeurism, for example. And, in fact,
much of what we might call casual snooping can be done from a nonjudgmental perspective - maybe I am just curious about how much
money you make. The move to the affective attitudes of others, rather
than the passive state of their knowledge, remains a useful insight into
the analytic core of personal privacy. But when all is said and done,
immunity from the judgment of others only captures a part of the concept of privacy, and it seems worthwhile to continue the quest for a
more all-inclusive analysis.
IV.

CLUSTER THEORIES OF PRIVACY

The right to privacy is another example. We value privacy; and
what we think of as the right to privacy is a cluster of rights that
protect it. But here it seems to me there is much slithering in the
literature: not only is the scope of this right unclear, it is unclear
what is even at the heart of it. But there are no sharp boundaries
around any of the cluster-rights,
even those much clearer than is
23
that of the right to privacy.
A.

The Diversity of Privacy

The concept of personal privacy encompasses a daunting array
of cases. Most of us expect some protection from the following sorts of
invasions:
23.

JuDIH JAvis THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 285 (1990).
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*
*
*
*
*

Having our offices or homes monitored
The spying of peeping-toms
Having our medical or financial records perused by others
Having personal information published in the tabloids
Having well-meaning, but overbearing, mentors lecture us on
career or marriage
* Unreasonable searches by the police
* "[U]nwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the right to bear or beget a
24
child."
Much of the privacy literature assumes some core notion that unites
this wide collection of moral, legal, and constitutional concerns. But,
perhaps, we are not dealing with a single concept, or right, at all, but a
complex amalgamation of legal and moral immunities misleadingly assembled under a single rubric.
This hypothesis has two immediate theoretical advantages. It
offers a very straightforward account of the past one hundred years of
privacy scholarship. No wonder the literature is in such disarray uniting these concepts would be like trying to offer a definition of a
bank that simultaneously included financial institutions, sides of rivers, and elevated turns in the roadway. Furthermore, if the
philosopher or academic lawyer is freed from the responsibility of offering all-inclusive analyses, perhaps genuine headway can be made
concerning concrete issues, such as the confidentiality of medical
records, or the Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches be reasonable. Although the case for abandoning the search for a unified
analysis of personal privacy is potentially strong, the traditional goal of
articulating an all-encompassing model of such an important moral
and legal notion also seems worth pursuing. We must, therefore,
briefly examine a couple of recent arguments for abandoning the traditional approach.

B.

Thomson's Derivative Theory

According to Judith Jarvis Thomson, the only clarity in the privacy literature is its unclarity: "[p]erhaps the most striking thing
about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have a very clear
idea what it is.25 She suggests three related sources of our analytical
befuddlement. First is our fragile understanding of the concept of a
24.

Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438.

25.

Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL
272 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman, Ed., Cambridge Press 1984).
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right to privacy. 26 Second, and equally important, are the pervasive
misunderstandings concerning rights, in general.2 7 Third is the hypothesis that we are not really dealing with a univocal concept at all
when we worry about the right to privacy. 28
It begins to suggest itself, then, as a simplifying hypothesis, that
the right to privacy is itself a cluster of rights, and that it is not a
distinct cluster of rights but itself intersects with the cluster of
rights which the right over the person consists in and also with the
cluster of rights which owning property consists in. 29
Professor Thomson is well-known among professional philosophers for the grace of her prose, and particularly, for her inspired use
of thought-experiments as rhetorical devices for arguing a conceptual
case. She begins with a good one: she and her husband are having a
fight that is very loud and they have carelessly left the windows open; I
stop to listen. 30 This is not very nice of me, perhaps it is even morally
wrong, but I do not violate their rights. 3 1 In contrast she asks us to
consider a slightly different scenario: she and her husband are again
fighting, but much quieter, and with the windows closed. 32 You listen
to them by training an amplifier on the house. 3 3 You have violated
their right to privacy. 3 4 I read Thomson as seeing the normative difference between these cases as a conceptual datum, a starting point for
discussion. I'm not completely convinced, but let's grant her point. By
her own account, we are not really discussing the nature of personal
privacy, but what is involved in having a (moral) right - in this case
the right to privacy. 35 These are very different issues. Thomson implicitly concedes that both examples potentially concern privacy; why
else explicitly contrast them? She further concedes that normative
conventions cover both cases. Suppose she is right that I do not violate
anyone's rights by listening to the louder fight. I can't be arrested or
sued, for example. I still may intrude on her and husband's privacy.
Indeed, I will be arguing that is precisely why what I have done is not
very nice, and probably wrong.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at

281.
273.
287.
281.
273.

272.
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Her account of why the second case of listening to the fight is a
violation of the right to privacy, and the first case is at worst an intrusion upon privacy, depends on an analogy with personal property. 36 As
with anything you own, you have certain concrete rights that derive
from the general right to property. Thus, you have a right that your
pornographic picture not be taken from you, damaged, or even looked
at by others without your permission - though if your "picture is good
pornography, it would be pretty mingy of [you] to keep it permanently
hidden so that nobody but [you] shall ever see it - a nicer person would
let his friends have a look too." 37 If I tear your picture up, I violate an
"ungrand" right of yours not to have your pornographic pictures destroyed; one that derives from your right to property. If I train my long
distance X-ray device on your wall safe where you keep the picture
squirreled away, I violate your "ungrand" right not to have your porn
looked at by others. We describe this latter case as deriving from your
right to privacy, but Thomson claims its source is really the right to
38
property.
Thomson argues that we also possess a general right "over our
own person." 39 Your specific rights over your left knee, to again poach
one of her examples, is not exactly a property right - you didn't buy it,
though you could sell it except for the problem of, "who'd buy a used
left knee?" 40 This "grand" right leads to several specific "ungrand"
rights - the right not to have your left knee damaged, or stroked, or if
you're shy, even looked at. When it comes to immunity from having
your knee damaged, this "ungrand" right derives from your right over
your own person. According to Thomson, in the case of the knee being
looked at, and perhaps simply touched, as well, we are tempted to derive the protection from the right to privacy, but it just as likely comes
41
from this general right over our own person.
Rights to property and over one's person are not inalienable;
they can be waived, sold, given away, or carelessly non-enforced. You
do not violate my right to property if you take home the pornographic
photograph that I carelessly left on the bus, nor do you violate my right
to property (and perhaps privacy) if you simply look at it there on the
bus seat. Similarly, in the left knee example, if you carelessly leave it
exposed for the entire world to see, we violate no right of yours 36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

275-78.
276.
275-80.
279.
279.
286.
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neither over your person, nor a right of privacy - if we all take a good
look. This is the crux of Thompson's argument about listening to the
fight between her and her husband. 42 By leaving the window open and
screaming at the top of their lungs, they have carelessly given away, or
43
at least not take proper steps to protect their right to privacy.
All of this is merely sets the stage for the derivative thesis.
Thomson correctly sees that merely re-describing situations involving
the right to privacy in language that does not specifically reference the
concept, or even in terms of differing normative entitlements, does not
establish the thesis that there is no distinct right to privacy:
The fact, supposing it is a fact, that every right in the right-to-privacy cluster is also in some other rights cluster does not by itself
show that the right to privacy is in any plausible sense a "derivative" right. A more important point seems to me to be this: the fact
that we have a right to privacy does not explain our having any of
the rights in the right to privacy cluster ....
I have a right that my
pornographic picture not be torn. Why? Because it's mine, because
I own it....
But I don't have a right not to be looked at because I have a right to
privacy; I don't have a right that no one shall torture me in order to
get personal information about me because I have a right to privacy; one is inclined, rather, to say that
it is because I have these
44
rights that I have a right to privacy.
There are a number of rights that I possess that I would have
naively taken to be explained by a more general right to privacy.
These include, at least, the following:
" I have a right not to be looked at (in certain culturally defined
contexts)
" I have a right not to have personal information about me
published
" I have a right not to be unreasonably searched
" I have a right not to have fundamentally important decisions
interfered with
Why? According to the derivative hypothesis, this is not because of any
general right to privacy - that is an illusion. Rather, if a right to privacy exists at all, it is because of these and other equally specific
rights.
Couldn't an argument of the same form be constructed for any
general right? Consider some specific property rights.
42.

See id. at 273-74.

43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 286.
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* I have a right that my car not be "borrowed" without my
permission
* I have a right that my articles on privacy not be copied
* I have a right that my acreage in the woods not be trespassed
upon
* I have a right to will my patent on my invention to my nephew
45
* I have a right to sell my used left knee
Suppose a derivative theorist of property were to claim that no general
right to property explains the specific rights, but rather it is the specific rights that give us the general right to property. In one sense, this
is exactly right. General concepts in the law usually come from specific
cases. Still, we gain insight by accounting for these specific rights in
terms of a general right to property.
This is exactly the response I want to give to the derivative account of the right to privacy. In one helpful sense, the general right to
privacy does derive from. specific cases. But that does not mean that it
is unhelpful or that it fails to explain or account for those very same
specific cases by appealing to a general right to privacy, particularly if
some unified theory of the abstract nature of privacy is forthcoming.
The fallacy here is to assume that conceptual explanation can only
work in one direction. Such a view of explanation is plausible in the
case of causal accounts, but much less plausible in moral philosophy or
jurisprudence.
Thomson's argument, after all, is not about privacy, but about
the right to privacy. 46 It is easy enough, however, to imagine what a
derivative theory of the nature of privacy would look like. No one has a
clear idea of what privacy is. The only thing that unites different examples of privacy is that we use the term, "privacy," to describe them.
This, of course, is possible, but I think extremely implausible. Privacy
scholars have found it extremely difficult to articulate a simple elegant
theory of the nature of privacy - that's almost a truism.4 7 But it hardly
follows that there is nothing other than our use of the word that unifies
the varied privacy concerns. I remain optimistic that there is, indeed,
something that brings together the different moral, legal, and constitutional concerns that we use the language of privacy to characterize.
45. See, id at 279. This, of course, is not a point about the current state of the law on
commerce in body parts, but a reference to Thomson's cute little example from the middle
1970s.
46.

Id. at 272.

47.

Id.
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C. DeCew's Multifaceted Model of Privacy
Judith DeCew's very interesting and useful analysis of privacy
candidly attempts to split the difference between the derivative approach championed by Thomson, and the narrow "unitary" approach
favored by Parent. 48 Almost everyone who has reflected on personal
and legal privacy has been struck with how varied its uses are in moral
and legal contexts. At the same time, we do find the use of a single
concept linguistically natural. An approach to privacy that acknowledges both of these conceptual data has a lot of initial plausibility.
We have seen that it is not possible to give a unique, unitary definition of privacy that covers all the diverse privacy interests. The
other extreme - abandoning the notion of privacy as meaningless or
completely derivative from other interests such as property or bodily security - is equally untenable. My approach, therefore, is to
take a middle course ....

I defend privacy as a broad and mul-

tifaceted cluster concept, [and] mark
out the contexts where it is
49
natural to view privacy as crucial.
DeCew characterizes privacy as a "cluster concept," 50 and
Thomson also referred to the "privacy cluster." 5 1 This notion is familiar
to contemporary philosophers, and is originally associated with the
work of Wittgenstein. He claimed that not every concept could be analyzed in terms of a simple set of logically necessary and sufficient
conditions that succinctly articulated the essence of the concept, and
he made his point with the famous example of games.
Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games." I mean
board-games, card games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on.
What is common to them all? - Don't say: "There must be something common, or that would not be called 'games"' - but look and
see whether there is anything common to all. - For if you look at
them you will not see something common to all, but similarities,
relationships, and a whole series of them at that.... [Tihe result of
this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities,
sometimes similarities of detail.... I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances";
for the various resemblances between members of a family: build,
features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and
48.

DECEW, supra note 16.

49.

Id. at 61.

50.

Id.

51.

Thomson, supra note 25, at 286.
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criss-cross
in the same way. - And I shall say: 'games' form a
52
family.

Such a view of philosophical analysis was quite popular in the
1950s, 60s, and 70s, but is much less utilized in contemporary work. It
is, however, commonly accepted that some concepts form a cluster or
family. It is not at all unreasonable to see privacy in such a light.
Much more controversial, however, is the claim that cluster concepts
have nothing in common besides family resemblances. It remains to be
seen whether privacy has a single unifying core that can be articulated
in an all-encompassing analysis. As Wittgenstein correctly saw, I believe, this is a quasi-empirical matter.
Conceptual analysts have reason to be optimistic that unifying
models are possible. The trick is to put into words what we see. When
we recognize a family resemblance between Aunt Sarah and her
nephew, what is it? Card games, board games, Olympic games, and
children's games all may have something in common - again, what is
it? Violations of personal and legal privacy - voyeurism, snooping,
appropriating one's image, searching without a warrant, denying the
authority to make fundamentally important decisions - may have
something in common. The challenge is to articulate this simple common feature. We have had very limited success in the past and this
may lead to modesty and pessimism regarding future attempts. But it
certainly does not follow that the task is impossible. If the cluster
analysis is the best we can do, so be it. There's plenty to be learned
from good family resemblance analyses. But I want to have another go
at a more unified model, one that says something about why these varied examples of privacy violations are all correctly put under the same
conceptual umbrella.
V.

GAvISON's ACCESS MODEL

"Our interest in privacy is related to our concern over our accessibility to others: the extent to which we are known to others, the
and the extent to
extent to which others have physical access to us,
53
which we are the subject of others' attention."

52.
1968).
53.

1980).

LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

31, 32 (Basil Blackwell

Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1979-
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Value Neutrality and Perfect Privacy

Ruth Gavison offers perhaps the most sophisticated analysis of
54
the concepts of personal and legal privacy in the current literature.
She begins with a straightforward rejection of the derivative theory, or
what she calls reductionist analyses, of the sort proposed by Thomson. 5 5 Privacy is a useful notion, she argues. 56 But how could it have
such obvious utility in everyday and legal contexts, if it did not possess
a coherent conceptual core? Philosophers and academic lawyers may
have had a difficult time producing an adequate model, but that should
not lead to abandonment of the project, only to more hard analytical
work.
Gavison argues that an adequate philosophical and legal analysis of privacy will need to demonstrate three distinct sorts of
conceptual coherence. 5 7 It will need to provide satisfying general answers to three related, but obviously different, sorts of questions:
" What is privacy, and how can we identify losses of privacy when
they have occurred
" Why is privacy normatively important, and why are losses of
privacy undesirable
" Why is privacy 58
legally important and why should privacy enjoy
legal protection
Answers to the latter questions are logically dependent on answers to
the former. 5 9 Thus, we must first discover the nature of personal privacy, before we will be in a position to say anything informative about
its normative importance, or its legitimate place within liberal legal
theory.
Since we must carefully distinguish the purely analytical question of what privacy is, from the normative question of why it is
important, Gavison insists on a strong form of value neutrality as a
basic criterion for conceptual analysis. 60 To the degree that conceptual
models should have utility to disputants on both sides of great moral
controversies, the insistence that we not beg any interesting moral
questions is essential. A model of privacy that could only be endorsed
by those holding a pro-choice position, for example, would be of little
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 422.
at 422-23.
at 423.
at 425.
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value in helping to clarify questions of privacy and abortion rights.
Gavison, however, is seeking something even purer in terms of normative impartiality. 6 1 She aspires to an analysis of privacy that can be
stated without the use of any normative notions whatsoever. She
therefore dismisses the idea that privacy is "a right, a claim, a form of
control, [or] a value .
. ," and insists that it must be an empirical
situation. 62 "The desire not to preempt our inquiry about the value of
privacy by adopting a value-laden concept at the outset is sufficient to
justify viewing privacy as a situation of an individual vis-a-vis others,
or as a condition of life." 63 The logical nature of such an objective condition of privacy is first approached through a thought-experiment.
Rather than reflecting on everyday examples of privacy, she asks her
readers to imagine total, or what she calls perfect, privacy - a condition
of complete isolation
In its most suggestive sense, privacy is a limitation of others' access
to an individual. As a methodological starting point, I suggest that
an individual enjoys perfect privacy when he is completely inaccessible to others. This may be broken down into three independent
components: in perfect privacy no one has information about X, no
64
one pays any attention to X, and no one has physical access to X.
Being stranded alone on a desert island, or locked in solitary confinement, or trapped in a spacecraft that is hurtling out of control into the
void, are conditions of increased privacy, since others have no information about you, nor have physical access to you, nor pay attention to
you. These examples strike us as odd because none of us want to be
stranded on desert islands, locked in solitary, or hurtling into the void,
but we all place great personal value on the enjoyment of our privacy.
Gavison is well aware that there is something counterintuitive in all of
this:
We start from the obvious fact that both perfect privacy and total
loss of privacy are undesirable. Individuals must be in some intermediate state - a balance between privacy and interaction - in
order to maintain human relations, develop their capacities and
sensibilities, create and grow, and even to survive. Privacy thus
cannot be said to be a value in the sense that the more
people have
5
of it, the better. In fact, the opposite may be true.6
61.

Id.

62.

Id. at 424-25.

63.

Id. at 425.

64.

Id. at 428.

65.

Id. at 440.
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Something is surely amiss, here. For one thing, unless the condition of perfect privacy has been continual since birth, even complete
isolation does not guarantee that one's privacy cannot be violated. A
disreputable publisher could choose to print a gossipy account of your
earlier life while you are stranded on the desert island. The publishers, as well as thousands of readers, could compromise your privacy by
finding amusement in the article. Perhaps even more surprising, however, is that privacy is characterized as being at odds with human
relationships, the growth of individual capacities and sensibilities; it
even threatens survival. It is a situation that must be balanced with
social interaction. Most of the literature sees privacy in a very different light. Rather than interfering with individual growth and the
establishment of important human relationships, the prevailing view
is that privacy is a necessary condition for their establishment and
66
maintenance.
B.

Coherence and Independence

.,,67
Although, "'[pirivacy' is a term with many meanings..
Gavison is committed to finding a coherent conceptual core. This core
can be expressed "suggestively" as "a limitation of others' access to an
individual." 68 But as we will see directly, in many privacy violations,
the idea of limited access is at best a metaphor. To discover the nonmetaphorical nature of privacy, it is necessary to consider three distinct and logically independent characteristics of privacy. Thus,
Gavison proposes a cluster analysis of privacy, though she never uses
the Wittgensteinian notion. Privacy is a concept with an identifiable
'family resemblance' that gives it conceptual coherence, but with characteristics that are logically independent in the sense that none are
individually logically necessary or sufficient.
The concept of privacy suggested here is a complex of these three
independent and irreducible elements: secrecy, anonymity, and solitude. Each is independent in the sense that a loss of privacy may
occur through a change in any one of the three, without a necessary
loss in either of the other two. The concept is nevertheless coherent
because the three are all part of the same
notion of accessibility,
and are related in many important ways. 69
66. See, Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1967-1968); see also JAMES RACHELS,
Why is Privacy Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 25, at 290.
67.

Gavison, supra note 53, at 424.

68.

Id. at 428.
Id. at 433-34.

69.
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I have already conceded that a well-executed cluster analysis
can be of great philosophical value. It may seem caviling, therefore, to
quarrel with Gavison's model, particularly since I believe that it contains most of what we need to know about personal and legal privacy.
My worries are twofold. I am unconvinced that any of the elements
above - secrecy, anonymity, or solitude - are essential components of
personal privacy. They are useful devices for the protection of privacy,
but not analytically central. Secondly, I believe that the entire analytic strategy got off on the wrong foot by a serious misrepresentation
of the needs and standards for normative neutrality within conceptual
models. Still, by teasing apart the very useful collection of insights
within the accessibility to others model, we may yet discover a single
non-metaphorical characteristic that unites the central cases of privacy
violation.
C. Gavison's Three Characteristicsof Privacy
1.

70
Characteristic One - Information known about an individual

One way that others can gain access to us is through information they have about us. Obviously, we are dealing with an extended,
or metaphorical, sense of gaining access. If Madonna is vacationing in
Australia, and my access to her is a cheesy tabloid article I am reading
about her here in the Pacific Northwest, then the sort of epistemological access in Gavison's first characteristic of privacy has nothing to do
with physical space. Still, the metaphor has resonance - I have gained
access to her life in ways that potentially implicate her privacy.
Gavison noted, in 1980, "the most lively privacy issue now discussed is related to information-gathering." 7 1 The observation is even
more applicable in our post-9/11 world. Any adequate account of personal privacy will have to naturally accommodate the centrality of our
normative concerns with the control of personal information.
Gavison's model does this nicely by addressing information twice over
- once through the metaphor of access by others, and then again, literally, as an independent and irreducible element.
Perhaps the greatest strength of Gavison's appeal to information as conceptually central to privacy is that my earlier gambit of
attacking by counter-example is effectively blocked. Information and
knowledge are merely two methods of gaining access to another. They
therefore count for very little that we can enumerate clear cases of pri70.
71.

Id. at 429.
Id.
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vacy violations that have little or nothing to do with knowledge or
information possessed by others. It would, of course, count against the
model if most of our worries about personal privacy had nothing to do
with information, but as we have seen, many of them clearly do. It
may seem, therefore, that the inclusion of information as conceptually
relevant to privacy, but neither logically necessary nor sufficient, is
just what the doctor ordered.
I stand by my earlier critique of information models, but I concede the challenge posed by Gavison's strategy. I must now restrict my
argument almost entirely to an appeal to my readers' intuitions about
violations of their own privacy. Suppose, for example, that you were
the unfortunate victim in the following situation. "If secrecy is not
treated as an independent element of privacy, then the following [is]
only [one] of the situations that will not be considered [a] loss of privacy: an estranged wife who publishes her husband's love letters to
her, without his consent .... " 72 I take it we all agree that you have a
normative complaint here, at least in part because your privacy has
been violated. Setting aside other moral concerns like the clear breaking of trust, what is so distressing about the love letters being made
public? We can imagine circumstances, of course, where some crucial
confidential fact is disclosed, but in most cases our worries have nothing to do with personal information. You might even desire that others
know that you are capable of composing mushy proclamations of your
undying affection, since this shows that you have a romantic side to
your personality. But you would still consider the letters private.
Gavison addresses the publication of the love letters as an instance of
"information known about an individual," 7 3 but I would say that the
case more appropriately turns on the attention of others. As the readers amuse themselves with your intimate bearing of your soul, you feel
violated because they are focusing their attention on you and a part of
your life that our culture recognizes as private. As I have said numerous times in this discussion, any facts or knowledge gained by the
reader are incidental, and quite beside the normative point. All of this
is perfectly compatible with the observation that keeping the love letters secret will quite effectively spare you the distress.

72.

Id.

73.

Id. at 429.
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Characteristic Two - Physical access to an individual

2.

There is, of course, an obviously non-metaphorical way in which
others can gain access to us. They can put themselves in "physical
proximity," to us where they are "close enough to touch or observe [us]
through normal use of [their] senses." 75 Gavison argues that the fact
"that our spatial aloneness has diminished" is cause for a potential privacy complaint.7 6 If we accept the value-neutral notion of "perfect"
privacy, then the mere fact of physical access on the part of others automatically counts as a diminishment of privacy. Whether or not this
is the case, the suggestion that spatial aloneness constitutes a part of
the analytic core of personal privacy is an intriguing, controversial, but
I will argue, an ultimately mistaken, hypothesis.
Gavison claims that a diverse list of privacy violations can be
most clearly appreciated in terms of illegitimate physical access to an
77
individual.
The following situations involving loss of privacy can best be understood in terms of physical access: (a) a stranger who gains entrance
to a woman's home on false pretenses in order to watch her giving
birth; (b) Peeping Toms; (c) a stranger who sits on "our" bench, even
though the park is full of empty benches; and (d) a move from a
single-person office to a much larger one that must be shared with a
colleague. In each of these cases, the essence of the complaint is not
that more information about us has been acquired, nor more attendrawn to us, but that our spatial aloneness has been
tion has been
78
diminished.
I fully agree with the observation that the acquisition of personal information has nothing to do with the essential nature of the privacy loss
in any of these examples. I am far from convinced, however, that the
diminishment of spatial aloneness takes us very far, either.
Recall the case of the peeping tom. Do victims truly feel violated because others had gained close physical access to them? I very
much doubt that this is the case. It is of course possible, that in certain
very specific contexts spatial considerations exacerbate the feeling of
unease. But, in general, doesn't the offense have more to do with the
thoughts and attitudes of the voyeur, and not his spatial location? By
Gavison's own criteria of close "physical proximity," the voyeur who
74.
75.

Id. at 433.

76.
77.

Id.
Id.

78.

Id.

Id.
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peeks through the window via a telescope does not diminish spatial
79
aloneness.
The ability to watch and listen, however, is not in itself an indication of physical access, because Y can watch X from a distance or
wiretap X's telephone. This explains why it is much easier for X to
know that Y has physical access to him then when Y observes
him.8 0
This has very puzzling consequences. The victim of the peeping tom
who has her privacy compromised by having her window peeked
through has had her spatial aloneness compromised. But the victim
who is spied upon from up the hill via a very powerful telescope does
not suffer this same loss of solitude. But the latter victim's privacy has
clearly been violated. The only one of Gavison's characteristics that
potentially covers her complaint is that she has illegitimately become
the object of the voyeur's attention.8 1 But, isn't this really a better account of the first victim's moral outrage, as well?
3.

82
Characteristic Three - Attention paid to an individual

The characteristic of privacy that I will argue is the most important component in Gavison's analysis receives slight attention within
the discussion. She introduces the affective notion of attention from
others in a very suggestive passage:
An individual always loses privacy when he becomes the subject of
attention. This will be true whether the attention is conscious and
purposeful, or inadvertent. Attention is a primary way of acquiring
information, and is sometimes essential to such acquisition, but attention alone will
cause a loss of privacy even if no new information
83
becomes known.
Professor Gavison is very careful to qualify the connection between attention and the acquisition of personal information with the language
of "primary way," and "sometimes."8 4 It is not that much of a stretch,
however, to wonder if there is not some stronger connection between
the concepts. Perhaps knowing certain sorts of information about an
individual always constitutes a form of paying attention to that person.
Don't I pay attention to Madonna when I read the Eleazy article? Al79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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though the discussion is getting ahead of itself, I am raising the
question of whether the notion of the attention of others is really independent from the notion of knowledge about others.
The strategy that is emerging calls into question Gavison's
claim that her privacy characteristics are logically independent and irreducible. We have seen in the case of the love letters that what she
takes to be a central case of a privacy violation in terms of information
known about another can not only be reduced to a case of attention
paid to an individual, but in fact, is more plausibly so characterized. In
a similar vain, the case of the peeping tom can be reduced with greater
normative insight from an instance of physical access to an individual
to one of illegitimate attention being paid. To make good on the
stronger hypothesis to be offered in the next section, I will need to convince my readers that all cases of informational violations of privacy,
and not just a few convenient ones, can be reduced to illegitimate attention being paid to an individual. I will also need to show that all
instances of loss of privacy resulting from physical access to an individual can plausibly be re-characterized in terms of illegitimate attention
by others.
VI.

IMMUNITY FROM THE FOCUSED ATTENTION OF OTHERS

"Private" used in this ...immunity-claiming way is both norm-dependent and norm-invoking. It is norm dependent because private
affairs and private rooms cannot be identified without some reference to norms. So any definition of the concept of "private affairs"
must presuppose the existence of some norms restricting unlicensed
observation, reporting, or entry, even though no norm in particular
is necessary to the concept. It is norm-invoking in that one need
say no more than "This is a private matter" to claim that anyone
85
not invited to concern himself with it ought to stay out of it.
A.

Norm-dependent Concepts

To leave all reference to values out of a conceptual model of a
normative notion can result, not in normative neutrality, but an impoverished conceptual picture. Stanley Benn gets it exactly right when
he observes in the quote above that the concept of privacy allows us to
claim a certain kind of norm-dependent immunity from others.8 6 The
85. Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 25, at 223.
86.
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exact nature of this immunity is, of course, still a matter of dispute.
We have seen how many scholars have characterized it in terms of
knowledge and information - an immunity from the knowledge of
others. Other theorists have articulated the prerogative as an immunity from the judgment of others. And, Ruth Gavison's model treats
personal privacy as an immunity from the access of others.
The implicit appeal to preexisting norms becomes clear when
we see that, at least in the case of immunity from knowledge, or immunity from judgment, no serious scholar has suggested anything like a
blanket immunity. Obviously we possess all sorts of personal information, and know quite a bit about others, without violating their privacy.
And we clearly form all sorts of judgments about others, both positive
and negative, without compromising their privacy. Thus, if privacy
consists of an immunity from knowledge or judgment, it is only within
certain very specific and largely culturally defined areas of a person's
life. We can make this disguised appeal to existing norms explicit by
recognizing that an implicit decision as to what is legitimate and what
is illegitimate underlies appropriate uses of the concept of privacy. All
of this suggests a pattern for theoretical models of privacy. Rather
than defining privacy in terms of some general immunity, X, it will be
more perspicuous to characterize it as an immunity from illegitimate
instances of X.
Ruth Gavison was insistent that her conceptual definition eschew use of value-laden components. 8 7 Her mistake, I would argue,
was not her admirable desire for a non-question-begging model, but
rather that she ignored the value-dependence of the concept she was
analyzing. Her central insights become much more plausible when privacy is recast as an immunity from the illegitimate access of others.
The three characteristics she identifies as independent aspects of personal privacy also gain increased plausibility when they are
articulated as limited areas of immunity - thus, immunity from illegitimate information being known by others, immunity from the
illegitimate attention of others, and immunity from illegitimate physical access by others.
Such a reformulation of the access model
completely does away with the need for the artificial, and I think misleading, notion of perfect privacy. But at the same time, it allows us to
see how complete physical inaccessibility would contingently guarantee that there was no form of illegitimate access on the part of others.

87.

Gavison, supra note 53.

IMMUNITY FROM FOCUSED ATTENTION

2007

B.

163

No One's Business

James Rachels suggests that we would be well-advised to more
of your business,"
seriously investigate the colloquial expression, "none
88
for conceptual clues regarding personal privacy.
A woman may rightfully be upset if her credit-rating is adversely
affected by a report about her sexual behavior because the use of
such information is unfair; however, she may also object to the report simply because she feels - as most of us do - that her sex life is
nobody else's business. This, I think, is an extremely important
point. We have a "sense of privacy" which is violated in such affairs, and this sense of privacy cannot adequately be explained
merely in terms of our fear of being embarrassed or disadvantaged
in one of these obvious ways. An adequate account of privacy
should help us understand what makes something "someone's business" and why intrusions into things that are "none of your
business" are, as such, offensive. 8 9
I would argue that the "none of your business" test does at least as
good a job of delineating the bounds of personal privacy as any of the
sophisticated analyses considered so far.
Judith DeCew demurred the possibility of producing a unitary
of
privacy, 90 but I think she has actually managed to articulate
model
one of the most promising candidates in the literature - one that fits
quite nicely with the none of your business insight. "I [have] developed
a proposal that takes the realm of the private to be whatever is not,
according to a reasonable person in normal circumstances, the legitimate concern of others. Clearly, the proposal as it stands is vague and
overbroad." 9 1 One philosopher's vagueness and over-breadth, it appears, is another's helpful insight. Reflection on psychological activity
that colloquial speech characterizes as concerning ourselves with another holds great promise as analytical device for probing the contours
of personal privacy.
What is it to concern ourselves with another? What is it for
others to make our business theirs? A metaphor from cinema is helpful here. There is a kind of zooming in, or tightening of cognitive and
emotional focus. The cocktail party is crowded and noisy; I hear random bits of several scattered conversations. All of a sudden, I am
struck with your animated exchange with your lover. I move in and
actively listen to what you're discussing. I have concerned myself with
supra note 66, at 292.

88.
89.

See
Id.

90.
91.

DECEw, supra note 16, at 61.
Id. at 62.
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your particular conversation; I've made it my business. And, of course,
in the context imagined, I have done all of this quite illegitimately.
C.

The Focused Attention of Others

Information models of privacy postulate what I have called an
epistemological relationship between the individual enjoying the immunity afforded by privacy conventions and others who would
potentially violate that immunity. For Gavison, the relationship is a
spatial one, with concepts of distance, and spatial and sensory barriers,
lurking in the background. 9 2 One of the advantages I would still claim
for the judgment of others model is that it recast the privacy relationship in much more candidly affective terms. Individuals were seen as
enjoying immunity from certain kinds of conscious thoughts and attitudes on the part of others. It turned out, of course, that the notion of
judgment was too narrow to capture all of the illegitimate thoughts
and attitudes through which others might violate another's privacy.
With a candid acknowledgment that the original inspiration
came from Gavison's characteristic of attention of others, I would like
to propose the following as the single conceptual core of personal privacy. 9 3 Privacy demarcates those areas of people's lives where they are
granted - both by cultural norms and legal traditions - limited immunity from the focused attention of others. I put this forward not in the
classical tradition of a single necessary and sufficient condition, but as
an explanatory hypothesis. Immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of others as a rubric for personal privacy provides, I claim, the
simplest, most complete, non-ad hoc, account; for these reasons, it is
the most plausible model.
As anyone who has ever put forward an interpretive theory
knows, it is much easier to attack one's rivals, than to construct a positive defense. I can think of no other way of proceeding than by
92. See Gavison, supra note 53, at 423.
93. The connection between privacy and focused attention has been noted in other
places in the literature, but, usually as a kind of aside. Consider, for example, Stanley
Benn's observation - [finding oneself the object of scrutiny, as the focus of another's
attention, brings one to a new consciousness of oneself, as something seen through another's
eyes." Benn, supra note 96, at 227. I was also surprised to discover that my friend and
colleague, Donald Crowley and I had also seen the connection a decade and a half ago.
"[Pirivacy might be viewed as culturally defined areas of immunity from being the subject of
others' attention. The generic terms 'others' and 'attention' are particularly useful. They
include the systematic judgment, in a normative or legal sense, of a whole culture or legal
system. They can also include the isolated gossipy attention of the individual who listens in
on a party line." Donald Crowley & Jeffery L. Johnson, Balancing and the Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 337, 354 (1988).
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tions, and then see whether the attention of others model successfully
captures the central concerns:
* Others illegitimately gain access to your medical or financial
records
* Others illegitimately publish the above information
* Others search or monitor your office, but find nothing
* Another peeps in your window
* Another lectures you on personal decisions you have made
* Another - a state actor - unreasonably searches you, or
* Another - the state - illegitimately interferes with an intimate
and "fundamentally important" personal decision
The illegitimate access to, and the publication of, sensitive personal records, deals with the ever-present concepts of personal
knowledge and information. I take it that there is nothing artificial or
ad hoc in postulating a concern with the illegitimate focused attention
of others as underlying our privacy concerns in connection to the forbidden acquisition and dissemination of personal information. The
failed office monitoring reminds us, again, that mere attempts to acquire information involve an active focusing of attention by others from
which we may be granted some limited immunity. Voyeurism shows
how our privacy can be compromised via the same sensory means by
which we gather much of our knowledge and yet have little to do with
the gathering of information. Our culture and legal system protect us
from these non-informational instances of focused attention by others,
nevertheless. A general, though at the same time very limited, immunity, not just from the knowledge of others or the physical access of
others, but also from the attitudes of others, allows us to fully appreciate instances of illegitimate judgment and meddling in another's
personal affairs such as the overbearing mentor. He focuses his attention on his research assistant - her person, her life, and her intimate
decisions - in ways that clearly violate our culture's norms. We see
that these concerns can be captured by the concept of personal privacy,
not just because they can plausibly be recast as areas of immunity from
focused attention, but also by how naturally the expression, "none of
your business" applies. The last instance from the brief inventory
above that falls within the immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of others with complete ease is an unreasonable state search.
In ways strongly analogous to those in which individuals can focus
their attention on you to gather information, or simply to snoop, government can also focus its attention on individual citizens. The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution happily guarantees its
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citizens immunity from such attention in the form of "unreasonable"
94
searches and seizures.
D. Fourteenth Amendment Privacy
A serious challenge for the immunity from the focused attention
of others is, perhaps, presented by instances of due process privacy. It
is a matter of considerable disagreement whether the penumbras of
the Bill of Rights 95 or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee citizens a right to make fundamentally important personal decisions. Justice Brennan was only one of the many
justices who believed that it did: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a child." 96 Other distinguished jurists, of course, have seen the matter very differently.
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though
there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any
law ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" of individuals. But there is not ....
I like my privacy as well as the next one,
but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a
right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional
97
provision.
Several privacy scholars have suggested so called "decisional"
privacy is at best a derivative or metaphorical notion and at worst a
simple linguistic mistake. Thus, Parent, from his perspective of semantic legislation is emphatic.
[A] person who is prohibited by law from making certain choices
should be described as having been denied liberty or freedom to
make them.... [We can meaningfully say that the right to liberty
embraces in part the right of persons to make fundamentally important choices about their lives and therewith to exercise
significant control over different aspects of their behavior. [This] is
clearly distinguishable from the right of privacy which condemns
unwarranted acquisition of undocumented personal knowledge. 98
Ruth Gavison is less the semantic legislator, but argues much the
same position in terms of conceptual and jurisprudential clarity.
94.

95.
96.
97.
98.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 508-509 (Black, J., dissenting).
Parent, supra note 6, at 273-74.
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[I] dentifying privacy as noninterference with private action, often
in order to avoid an explicit return to "substantive due process,"
may obscure the nature of the legal decision and draw attention
away from important considerations. The limit of state interference
with individual action is an important question that has been with
us for centuries. The usual terminology for dealing with this question is that of "liberty of action." It may well be that some cases pose
a stronger claim for noninterference than others, and that the intimate nature of certain decisions affects these limits. This does not
justify naming this set of concerns "privacy," however. A better way
to deal with these issues may be to treat them as involving questions of liberty, in which enforcement may raise difficult privacy
issues. 99

Although there is a clear difference between the sort of immunity from state attention that the Fourth Amendment affords citizens,
and the immunity from state interference recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, I think it is entirely
appropriate to use the concept of privacy to describe both of them. For
one thing, it is quite natural to respond to the state's concerns with
contraception, abortion decisions, withholding medical treatment, and
issues of sexual intimacy, with the dismissal that it is none of their
business. And, indeed, those on the other side of these substantive
controversies implicitly respond in terms of personal privacy, arguing
that the protection of fetal life, or the state's interest in prohibiting
homosexual sodomy, are precisely the sort of things that democratic
governments should concern themselves with. I am an unashamed
partisan on these questions; I am convinced they are unquestionably
none of the state's business. However, I fully recognize that equally
reflective people see these matters differently. In the present context, I
am simply trying to locate the conceptual home for our debate, and
describing it as a disagreement over the parameters of Fourteenth
Amendment privacy seems true to colloquial and legal usage. 10 0
There are at least two ways in which the government can focus
its attention on its citizens. The first, of course, is in ways analogous to
tabloid reporters, snoops, and voyeurs. It can single you out as a person - tapping your phone, investigating your banking records, or
searching your car. The state can also focus its attention on you because you fall within a group engaged in a certain kind of behavior.
Government focuses on speeders, for example, by passing laws restricting choices to drive beyond proscribed limits. Almost all of us concede
that this is a quite legitimate instance of focused attention. We are
99.
100.

Gavison, supra note 53, at 358.
Johnson, supra note 21.
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much less comfortable, however, when the attention focuses on choices
that are "fundamentally important" and intimate - such as those dealing with reproduction, pregnancy, sexuality, and death.
E.

Focused Attention and Spatial Aloneness

In the course of defending her access model of privacy, Ruth
Gavison included a small laundry list of instances where individuals'
privacy was clearly compromised. 10 1 One of her examples is a potentially serious problem for the immunity from the focused attention
model: "[t]he following situation involving loss of privacy can best be
understood in terms of physical access ... a stranger who chooses to sit
on 'our' bench, even though the park is full of empty benches. 1 0 2
The first thing that must be conceded is how natural it is to use
the rubric of privacy to articulate the normative concerns raised in this
example. To paint the scene, picture that you and I are in the park
together on the bench. Perhaps we are lovers and our conversation is
intimate; perhaps we are colleagues and the discussion is professional;
or perhaps we are casual acquaintances and talking about last night's
ball game. When the stranger chooses "our" bench over all the empty
ones we are on alert and offended. Why? If my analysis of privacy is
correct, our moral complaint must concentrate on the stranger's focused attention on us. We suspect he has focused on us. Why else has
he chosen "our" bench? We worry that he will further focus on our conversation. All of this focused attention, actual and potential, is quite
illegitimate in our cultural context.
But isn't this a little strained? Gavison claims that the mere
condition of his physical access, regardless of imputed motives or other
psychological states of the stranger, is enough to trigger privacy concerns.1 0 3 I certainly want to concede that there are complicated and
mysterious conventions concerning interpersonal distance and other
spatial considerations in our culture. Anyone who has spoken with people from different cultures with different "conversational distances," or
simply individuals, who are insensitive to our conventions, knows that
too much, and particularly too little, distance can be quite unsettling.
The park example gains part of its punch, not so much from privacy
conventions, but from other spatial conventions that we all recognize,
even if we find them difficult to articulate.
101.

Gavison, supra note 53, at 354.
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I think we see that psychological features, like focused attention, are central to our privacy concerns by imagining them to be
absent in the stranger scenario explained above. Suppose that he is
lonely, speaks not a word of English, and simply desires closeness.
Even if we are still somewhat uncomfortable, the fact that our conversation is not the focus of his attention certainly alleviates some of our
privacy concerns. What if he's blind and deaf, and was completely unaware that we were sitting on "his" bench? Could the stranger
accidentally violate our privacy? Under Gavison's spatial access
model, perhaps he could. 10 4 I would argue, however, that accidental
violations of personal privacy, at least in the present context, make no
sense. And indeed, the necessity for some kind of intent becomes an
argument for the illegitimate focused attention perspective. The psychological, and perhaps normative, intentions of privacy violators
emerge as part of meaning of a privacy violation. This is just what we
should expect, given the norm dependence of the concept of privacy.
VII.

Two APPROACHES TO RULES

[I] s privacy's value best described in consequentialist or deontological terms? Case law mentions that privacy is valuable for such
diverse purposes as "promotion of free discourse," "to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness," "leading lives in health
and safety" in the home, "to keep secret or intimate facts about oneself from the preying eyes or ears of others," and the promotion of
personal relationships. With claims such as these, the courts suggest that privacy is valuable because of its desirable consequences.
Yet there is also a deontological strand in legal privacy theory. The
law contains suggestions that privacy's value stems from respect for
"man's spiritual nature," "individual dignity," and "inviolate personality." Since a consequentialist account of privacy's value will
ultimately clash with a deontological account, we must arbitrate between them if we decide that privacy does possess an independent
value. 105
The history of normative thought teaches that consequentialist
justifications of moral positions must forever be at war with deontological defenses. Much of academic law seems to have bought into a
similar approach to legal rules. This is curious since scholars have
long noticed that rules - in games, legal contexts, or basic ethical principles - can be examined from both a forward-looking perspective that
assesses the future consequences of new rules and any changes to ex104.

See Gavison, supra note 53, at 433.

105.

Inness, supra note 15, at 18.
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isting rules, as well as a backward-looking perspective that seeks to
correct injustice and unfairness.
John Rawls illustrated this important point about rules with
the classic example of legal punishment:
One can say, then, that the judge and the legislator stand in different positions and look in different directions: one to the past, the
other to the future. The justification of what the judge does, qua
judge, sounds like the retributive view; the justification of what the
(ideal) legislator does, qua legislator, sounds like the utilitarian
view. Thus both sides have a point (this is as it should be since
intelligent and sensitive persons have been on both sides of the argument); and one's initial confusion disappears once one sees that
these views apply to persons holding different offices and duties,
and situated differently with
respect to the system of rules that
10 6
make up the criminal law.
Rawls' distinction between a rule administrator's perspective on rules
and a policy maker's perspective is both insightful and misleading.
The umpire has no choice but to call the batter out on the third strike,
the rules clearly state what is to be done, and her job is to see to it that
balls and strikes are determined, and that the rules are carried out. It
makes no difference if all sorts of good consequences would follow from
allowing this particular batter to have four strikes. But when the
Rules Committee meets to consider changes in the rules, such as
whether the designated hitter rule should be standardized, or done
away with, potential good and bad effects of the changes dominate the
discussion.
Most judicial work involves easy cases. Jurisprudential questions about what the law is get scholarly attention, but most of a
judge's time is spent like an umpire determining balls and strikes and
sending players to first base or back to the dugout. One need not be a
conservative to believe that a judge's first responsibility is to interpret
and administer existing law, not to make new law. Legislators, however, are supposed to make new and better laws. It is hard to imagine
how they could adequately exercise this responsibility without paying
primary attention to the social, financial, and perhaps legal effects of
their proposed changes and creations. Utilitarian questions like the
deterrent effect of some proposed increase in punishment, or potential
gains in economic efficiency resulting from common law changes in accident law, are exactly the sort of things these policy makers should be
asking themselves. Deontological questions, however, like what pun106. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in
Press 1999).
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ishmpnt a convicted criminal deserves, or what is the fairest
settlement of a particular lawsuit, sound more like the umpire making
tough calls - ball or strike, out or safe - but working within a context
where the rules are already spelled out.
This tidy compartmentalization is compromised, however, by a
number of practical and legal considerations. First, of course, is the
simple fact that both judges and legislators are human beings who
think and act both inside and outside their institutional roles at the
same time. Judges can be fully aware of what the law is, yet still be
concerned with the economic, social, and legal consequences of their
decisions. 10 7 Indeed, we would be disappointed if they were not. Similarly, a legislator's vote on a crucial bill may be every bit as dependant
on his sense of what is just and fair as it is on any utilitarian calculation of the potential consequences of the proposed legislation. Rule
administrators, as well as rule makes, will therefore be doomed to contemplate their actions from both the forward-looking perspective and
the backward-looking perspective, at the same time.
Most damaging of all to the Rawlsian taxonomy, however, is
that the most perplexing questions about rules fall between the stark
extremes of decisions to have a rule or not, and decisions about what
the rule dictates. Consider the contemporary debate about capital
punishment. We have pretty clear moral rules about killing people.
These moral rules have always been enshrined in criminal law. Utilitarian arguments - deterrence, public safety, the avoidance of private
revenge - have always been a part of the moral and policy defenses of
the rules proscribing criminal homicide. Within specific jurisdictions
the rules articulate maximum criminal penalties. A judge's potential
sentence is bound by these existing rules. But what happens when the
debate is not about whether we should have rules against murder, but
what the maximum punishment should be? Rawls is unequivocal.
"The decision whether or not to use law rather than some other mechanism of social control, and the decision as to what laws to have and
what penalties to assign, may be settled by utilitarian arguments."1 0 8
Such an emphatic assignment of the creation and change of criminal
penalties to utilitarian policy making may seem surprising coming
from a philosopher who would become one of the most outspoken critics
of utilitarianism, but his views kept with the spirit of the early 1950's
where utilitarian thinking dominated criminology. In the contemporary debate about capital punishment, however, the Rawlsian
107. RICHARD POSNER, WHAT Do JUDGES
(Harvard University Press 1995).
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assignment seems both artificial and normatively misleading. Consequentialist considerations, such as the death penalty's deterrent effect
or the costs of executions, play a huge part in the debate. But it is
painfully obvious that retributive arguments, along with other considerations of procedural and corrective justice, play an equally dominant
role. We would also expect policy makers to ask what the ultimate
price should be for first-degree murder and whether capital punishment is administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
When all is said and done, I would argue that the safest response is to simply acknowledge that both backward-looking and
forward-looking arguments have always played legitimate roles in our
thinking about moral and legal rules. Our task is not some grand ontological theory about moral truth, but a better understanding of how we
think about these questions. When the issue is our privacy - our immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of others - it is obvious
to me that both backward-looking and forward-looking considerations
will be integral parts of a full understanding of the normative importance of privacy.
VIII.

FORWARD-LOOKING JUSTIFICATIONS OF PRIVACY

[The right to privacy] deals.. . with a cluster of immunities which,
if acknowledged, curb the freedom of others to do things that are
generally quite innocent if done to objects other than persons, and
even to persons, if done with their permission. There is nothing
intrinsically objectionable in observing the world, including its inhabitants, and in sharing one's discoveries with anyone who finds
them interesting; and this is not on account of any special claims,
for instance, for scientific curiosity, or for a public interest in the
discovery of truth. For I take it as a fundamental principle in
morals a general liberty to do whatever one chooses unless someone
else has a good reasons for interfering to prevent it .... The onus of
justification, in brief, lies on the advocate of restraint, not on the
person restrained. 10 9
A.

Rules, Liberty, and the Focused Attention of Others

Rules constrain free choice. The umpire must send the batter to
first base after ball four - the rules say so. I must drive on the right
side of the road even though the address I am looking for is more easily
seen from the left. Privacy norms limit your choice to illegitimately
focus attention on me. Stanley Benn postulated a fundamental norma109.

Benn, supra note 85, at 225.
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tive principle that the onus lies with proponents of rules that limit free
choice, and this seems exactly right. 110 The policy maker, or the anthropologist trying to reconstruct a functional account of social norms,
is most likely to appeal to good consequences brought about by the
rules even though they limit options. We value freedom, but constrain
it in certain ways because the constraints make the world better than
it would otherwise be. This is the logic of the classical social contract,
the cutting-edge economics of law, and the solution to the prisoner's
dilemma. Even when the normative considerations in favor of adopting the rules are articulated in deontological terms like justice or
respect for persons, the argument still has a forward-looking flavor to
it. The world will be better in the future with these particular rules
than it was in the past without them.
The forward-looking calculations that would justify rules granting individuals immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of
others will have to be very compelling. Focusing attention on another
is not simply an idle choice, like deciding to wear a Hawaiian shirt
rather than a plaid one. We are all, to some degree, voyeurs and gossips. Cultures vary in their judgments about the seriousness and
parameters of "observing the world, including its inhabitants, and
sharing one's discoveries with anyone who finds them interesting," but
all cultures recognize that people do these things. Thus, privacy rules
seek to constrain a very natural human tendency that we all have to
focus attention on others. Furthermore, the focused attention of others
often has clear good consequences for society as a whole. What others
know and think about us obviously affects our behavior. It significantly improves the chances we will do the morally correct thing, the
thing that the law requires. Nevertheless, most of us recognize that
regardless of how natural it is to disregard privacy, and how inconvenient privacy rules may be when it comes to fighting crime or "wars" on
crime, drugs, or terror, rules demarcating areas of immunity from the
focused attention of others are important enough to outweigh these
counter-forces.
B.

Pain and the Attention of Others

I assume that victims of privacy violations typically experience
tangible psychological pain. Some might argue that this pain is a cultural artifact, and that there are, or at least we can imagine there
might be, cultures where none of the things we treat as private would
110.
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be seen as sensitive or intimate. So what? Three things pain me as I
write this section. A tooth is bothering me and I fear a visit to the
dentist is in order. The chronic ache in my left knee is acting up, and
short of surgery, aspirin will have to do. Lastly, I am having a big fight
with my bosses about retaining a position in my department, and it is
driving me crazy. The first two instances of pain are well-understood
physiological occurrences that no doubt have evolutionary explanations. The last is an all-too-familiar example of contemporary
capitalist and corporate culture, with a twist that is somewhat idiosyncratic to the academy. There is nothing intrinsically pain-inducing
about a resource being reallocated within an organization. I am smart
enough to realize that from a purely selfish perspective, the change has
almost no effect on my job. Issues of departmental prestige, and probably unfair worries about arbitrary and vindictive administrative
decisions, are in no sense a natural part of a human being's biological
existence. But, again, so what? If you ask me which pain I would most
like"to be rid of, there is no question. The unfairness of the decision
gnaws at me - it upsets my stomach, causes me to lose sleep, and just
plain bums me out - while the discomfort from the tooth and knee easily recede to the background. The fact that it has a psycho-social
origin, rather than a physiological one, is irrelevant from my phenomenological perspective.
I suspect, however, that responding to illegitimate focused attention with alarm, discomfort, and pain, might actually have an
ancient biological origin. Other privacy scholars have had similar intuitions. Alan Westin, for example, writing two generations ago offered a
very contemporary sounding socio-biological account of privacy:
Man likes to think that his desire for privacy is distinctively
human, a function of his unique ethical, intellectual, and artistic
needs. Yet studies of animal behavior and social organization suggest that man's need for privacy may well be rooted in his animal
origins, and that men and animals share several basic mechanisms
for claiming privacy among their fellows.11 1
It would be surprising were we not genetically predisposed to register
the focused attention of others. Many species are keenly aware of an
individual organism's gaze within their own species, such as rivals and
potential mates, and of the gaze of other species, both predators and
prey. Among highly complex social species such as our own, the biological advantages of heightened sensitivity to the attention of others
become even more complicated and important. One of the persistent
111.
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2007

IMMUNITY FROM FOCUSEDATTENTION

problemns, of course, fror ti.-ks kind of socion-ilogrilhnth-e.-

175
i-, how

to marshal compelling evidence, a task that is certainly beyond my
area of expertise. Thus, I am reduced to a thought-experiment which
appeals to my readers' intuitions.
Imagine that you are out to dinner and a rude stranger continues to stare at you. Imagine that the voyeur watches you in an
intimate moment. Imagine that your finances or medical problems are
published in the tabloids. You are pained by this. But is this simply a
learned response on your part? Culture plays a part here, but is it the
whole story? A common misconception is that nature and nurture offer
rival accounts of behavior and other phenotypical characteristics. But
any evolutionary theorist will tell you that nature and nurture always
work as partners in explaining anything of interest in the biological
world. 1 12 We know, for example, that the disposition to sing has clear
genetic origins in songbirds. 11 3 The fact remains, however, that they
must learn how to sing. If individuals are not exposed to the songs of
their own species in their youth, they are doomed to the production of
pitiful sounds that are at best a poor parody of the beautiful and individually unique compositions of their socially trained fellows. Our
culture teaches us a lot about personal privacy; I take that as a given.
But it is not unreasonable to speculate that the pain that normal
human beings experience when they are victims of illegitimate focused
attention of others is partly biological. This will be true even if it is our
culture that largely defines the boundaries of what is legitimate and
illegitimate, and even if we are capable of learning to live with lots of
focused attention in our daily lives.
Therefore, one clear reason for circumscribing general liberty
and placing moral and legal restrictions on certain kinds of focused attention is that it causes harm to others when their privacy is not
respected. We place moral, common law, and criminal restrictions on
punching people in the nose largely because it hurts so much to be a
victim of one of these punches. It doesn't really matter whether the
pain of being the victim of illegitimate focused attention is more like
my frustrations with my bosses, or more like the songbird with a genetic predisposition to sing. Whatever the origins of the pain we feel
when our privacy is violated, a world that avoids this pain is much
better than one that allows it. As with almost every insight in the privacy literature, this one has been around for a long time. "The intense
intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening of sensations
112. RicHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 3 (Oxford University Press 1989).
113. Eliot A. Brenowitz & Michael D. Beecher, Song Learning in Birds: diversity and
plasticity, opportunitiesand challenges, 28 TRENins IN NEUROSCIENCEs 3, 128 (2005).
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which came with the advance of civilization, made it clear to men that
only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical
things. Thoughts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal
1 14
recognition."
C. Privacy and Social and Political Freedom
None of us would desire to live in a world of complete privacy. I
am not referring to Gavison's imagined perfect privacy, which, as we
saw, was nothing more than complete isolation. Rather, the thoughtexperiment was one of total immunity from the focused attention of
others. The reason we would not want such immunity, of course, is
that absolute privacy seems to be a causally sufficient condition for
complete freedom, and complete freedom sounds an awful lot like a
Hobbesian state of nature. None of us trust our comrades enough to
grant them total freedom.
This obvious line of thought has led some scholars to wonder
just how normatively valuable privacy is in the first place. Do not
these immunities simply provide shields that further the cause of
crime, sexual and spousal abuse, and other sorts of social and moral
evil? It is undeniable that there is a tangible social cost to the robust
recognition of areas of immunity from the judgment and focused attention of others. People will, no doubt, take advantage of the privacy of
their homes, or their relationships, or their conversations, or their email exchanges, to do things that we not only wish they would not do,
but which moral and legal rules proscribe. But most of us, including
the most outspoken communitarian and feminist skeptics, see independent value in personal privacy. The reasons are obvious. The privacy,
which allows crime and wrong to take place away from the focused attention of the rest of us, at the same time allows individual liberty and
autonomy to flourish. The world is better with some real privacy in it
because the world is better when individuals have some genuine
freedom.
Forward-looking justifications of privacy in terms of freedom
and autonomy are common in the literature. The virtues of political
and legal liberty have received the lion's share of the scholarly attention. This makes sense because the focused attention of government on
an individual's behavior is so tangible. We all know how driving patterns on the interstate are changed when others see the trooper's
patrol car. Speeding is a bad thing, and the focused attention of law
114.
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enforcement on speeders is far from ileitimste, but when that same
attention is focused on other aspects of our lives, most of us are uncomfortable. Governmental attention is often judgmental, focusing on
whether a particular behavior is criminal, subversive, or otherwise socially undesirable. Most of this judgmental attention is a good thing;
that is why we have laws and police officers in the first place. But
liberal societies insist that individuals be granted certain areas of immunity from this official focused attention. We grant these areas of
legal, constitutional, and moral immunity at least in part because we
value freedom and autonomy within these areas. 1 15
As worrisome as the illegitimate focused attention of legal and
political authority is, it is probably not the greatest threat to individual
liberty. This point has been made time and again in the literature, but
remains all too easy to forget. John Stuart Mill saw it clearly.
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is
still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of
the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when
society is itself the tyrant - society collectively over the separate
individual who compose it - its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political
functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates; and
if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, of any mandates at all
in things which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny
more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since,
though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves
fewer means of escape, penetrating much 116
more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.
Mill's famous solution to the problem of tyranny of the majority was to
articulate a limit on both social and legal mandates. The behavior and
choices proscribed had to run a real danger of causing harm to others.
Nevertheless, Mill's problem from the very beginning was that almost
any behavior had some potential harmful effect on others. Since it is
the majority which does the alleged tyrannizing, this majority of citizens have already registered their judgment that the proscribed
behavior constitutes a tangible social threat. Thus, Mill's protection
evaporates to an empty limit on social and legal constraints for freedom and choice.
Perhaps the recognition of personal privacy is a more efficient
means of filtering out the inappropriate judgments and proscriptions of
society. Greater individual liberty and autonomy will exist in a society
115. FERDINAND DAVID
University Press 1992).
116. JOHN STUART MILL,

SCHOEMAN,
ON LIBERTY

PRIVACY

AND

SOCIAL

63 (Penguin Books 1985).

FREEDOM

(Cambridge

FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW

178

Vol. 2:1:131

that recognizes immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of
others. This is precisely the forward-looking normative justification of
personal privacy that was presented in Ferdinand Schoeman's insightful last work. 117 He fully concedes the importance of a closely
connected social arrangement that will necessarily include what I am
calling the focused attention of others. Such a society is necessary,
among other things, for the very preconditions of liberty and
autonomy.
Much of what is most important about our life would be lost, would
be inaccessible to us, were we uninfluenced - unpressured, if you
will - by what we see around us. Most, if not all, of our effectiveness as social agents would be undermined by the elimination of the
kinds of pressures and influences that philosophers in the analytic
tradition treat as rationally corrupting ....
Most of our protections
from a monolithic social and political tyranny depend on participation in associations. The survival and effectiveness of these
associations presuppose the availability of forces to bring about conformity with group norms - forces
such as loyalty to group
118
participants, methods, and ends.
Social pressure is a good thing in both the culture as a whole
and in smaller associations like family and friends. Focused attention
helps produce adherence to group-defined norms. At the same time,
however, too much focused attention can produce blind conformity and
a loss of individual autonomy. According to Schoeman, the most important function of personal privacy is to regulate the fine line
distinction between the appropriate social pressure that produces order and genuine associations, and the excessive social pressure that
precludes freedom and autonomy. As important as it is to have immunity from legal and governmental pressure, immunity from a more
amorphous social pressure is even more crucial to genuine social freedom and individual liberty. "I aim to understand the dimensions of
privacy that arise in our social encounters. I argue that privacy in the
contexts of our social relations protects us from social overreaching limits the control of others over our lives." 1 9
This sort of forward-looking functional account of the value of
privacy conventions does not imply any sort of conscious awareness of
the salutatory effects on the part of anyone. The subtle forces of cultural selection, just like many of the factors in natural selection, may
operate at levels far removed from the cultural and normative justifica117.
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tions familiar t most members of the snriety, or ev.n to humanists
and social scientists producing scholarly analyses of the conventions.
The beauty of an account such as Schoeman's "overreaching hypothesis" is that it allows us to get a glimmer of the cultural mechanisms
that must have been at work, even though it is hard to imagine any
conclusively confirming data to be discovered, or any crucial experiment to be conducted.
IX.

BACKWARD-LOOKING JUSTIFICATIONS OF PRIVACY

By insisting that there are personal boundaries that the state may
not overstep, interior regions into which it cannot penetrate, liberalism expresses its respect for the inherent dignity, equality,
individuality, interiority, and subjectivity of the individuals who
compose it. Inviolability is a form of equality; people who are less
than equal are people who can be violated. A liberal state respects
the fact that each individual has some precious and incommensura120
ble inner essence that must be protected from official scrutiny.

A.

Backward-Looking Perspectives on Legal Rules

Much of the literature on the moral significance of privacy seeks
to expand on the forward-looking, or consequentialist, justifications
just discussed. Almost every theorist will concede that there is pain
engendered by illegitimate focused attention and that the absence of
privacy is contingently related to diminished personal freedom and autonomy. Many scholars, however, suggest that there is something
deeper at stake in our concern with privacy. The recognition of areas
of immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of others may result in a world where there is less pain and more freedom, but this
immunity has other, perhaps more profound, normative virtues. The
literature claims, for example, that privacy is connected with "man's
spiritual nature,"121 that it provides "moral capital" for the formation
of significant personal relationships like friendship and love, 122 that it
is fundamental to human intimacy, 123 and that it "is a social ritual by
means of which an individual's moral title to his existence is con120.
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ferred." 12 4 All of these fascinating, and often profound, normative

analyses seem to have a forward-looking orientation to rules, despite
their often explicit rejection of consequentialism. They attempt to
blend moral insights, facts about social psychology, and phenomenological reflections on privacy and its violation. They then explain why a
world that respects areas of limited immunity from the focused attention of others is better than a world without such privacy protection.
In a sense, however, they simply provide additional detail supporting
the general forward-looking considerations of protecting individuals
from pain and facilitating greater personal autonomy and freedom.
B. Respect for Persons
Kant's famous categorical imperative, in its second articulation,
reads as follows. "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person, or that of another, always as an end and never as a means
only."1 25 Kant recognized that there was something special, both psy-

chologically and normatively, about human beings. Simply by virtue of
being a part of humanity people are entitled to special moral consideration. Although we treat each other as means to our ends, the
categorical imperative requires that we also treat one another as
"ends" as well. We are required, says Kant, to recognize that individuals are psychologically unique, having their own dreams and fears, and
that they are agents acting out their own lives according to their own
choices, values, and goals.1 26 Human beings are persons, in a philosophically technical sense, and they are entitled to respect simply
because of this special characteristic of personhood.
A number of contemporary scholars have suggested that the
Kantian principle of respect for persons gets at the normative heart of
personal privacy. 127 Granted there are all sorts of forward-looking advantages to granting immunity from the focused attention of others,
but the underlying moral claim is grounded on the simple fact that we
are people, and personal privacy is one of the rights we have for this
reason alone.
A principle of respect for persons is generated from an underlying
notion of personhood. Because a human possesses certain morally
124.
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significant traits of personhood, she is entitled to be treated with
respect with regard to those traits. These traits have been characterized in a variety of ways (e.g., self-consciousness and moral
agency), but the characteristic that has been brought to the forefront of privacy theory is the human capacity for rational choice.
Given that an agent possesses that capacity, it follows that she has
a justified moral claim to being treated with the respect due to a
person.128

The Kantian insight is to some degree an empirical hypothesis. Cognitive psychology, sociology, as well as common human experience,
combine to tell a familiar story. We are not only a conscious species,
but a self-conscious one. We learn very early in life to be aware, not
just of the world and the others who share it, but of ourselves and what
others are thinking about us. The focused attention of others causes us
to become aware of ourselves. This is often a good thing. However,
there are occasions where it is very bad as well. In the first place, it
causes pain. Secondly, it interferes with free agency - remember the
interruption of traffic patterns on the interstate when drivers see the
state patrol car, or reflect on your own disinclination to sing along with
your favorite CD when others are present. For these reasons, cultures
grant some limited immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of
others. The conventions, the normative rules, and the laws which codify this immunity, are now firmly in place and help to define what it is
to be a full-fledged person in this culture. Simply because of the kind
of moral, social, and biological entities we are, we are worthy of respect
and dignity, including limited sanctuary from the focused attention of
others.
C. Disrespect, Insult, and the Value of Privacy
A common theme in the privacy literature is that the normative
virtues of privacy can be articulated in terms of the backward-looking
values of respect for persons and human dignity. I want to exploit this
insight by focusing on those cases where our privacy has been violated,
and try to understand the moral attitudes of victims of illegitimate focused attention by others. These victims were not accorded the respect
that our culture demands for any human being. They were, I suggest,
insulted in a fundamental way that strikes at the heart of human
dignity.
Understanding privacy violations in terms of disrespect, insult,
and the denial of basic dignity allows us to explain a number of puz128.
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zling features of personal privacy. There are ranges of different ways
in which one can be the victim of illegitimate focused attention by
others and yet not suffer tangible economic or psychological damage.
One way is to be indifferent to the insult. My students may call me old
fashion and inflexible, intending it as an insult, but I may react with
amusement, even pride. My local supermarket probably focuses illegitimate attention on my grocery and liquor purchases by requiring the
scanning of my "club card" in order to receive discounts. In the right
frame of mind, I could take great offense by this. But as a matter of
fact, I just don't care that much. We are puzzled, even troubled, by
victims of physical assault who don't defend their rights. But we admire individuals who can laugh off the casual insults of their neighbors
or fellow drivers. I'm not suggesting that we should either be troubled
by victims of illegitimate focused attention of others who do not take
offense, or that we should admire them. However, we should not be
surprised that there will be some real variance in the individual sensitivity to, and tolerance of, privacy violations.
A second way that individuals can escape tangible loss when
their privacy is violated is to be blind to the illegitimate focused attention. Perhaps my colleagues continually insult me behind my back, but
I am neither angered nor saddened because I never find out. One's
privacy can be violated egregiously, yet the person suffers no pain or
embarrassment, because of blissful ignorance. Most of us have a
strong intuition, however, that regardless of the absence of pain, selfconsciousness, or personal or professional disadvantage, victims of unknowing privacy violations have been wronged just the same.
But respect for persons will sustain an objection even to secret
watching, which may do no actual harm at all. Covert observation
- spying - is objectionable because it deliberately deceives a person
about his world, thwarting, for reasons that cannot be his reasons,
his attempts to make a rational choice .... C is unaware of A. ...
[T]he significance to him of his enterprise, assumed unobserved, is
deliberately falsified by A. He may be in a fool's
paradise or a fool's
1 29
hell; either way A is making a fool of him.
The disrespect hypothesis also beautifully accounts for the clear
cultural component of personal privacy. What actions, gestures, and
words constitute an insult is clearly a matter of convention. In no way
does this soften the pain or the moral importance of the insult. One
can easily imagine a culture where raising the middle finger is understood to communicate, "you're number one, you're the best," but clearly
not in our culture. The areas of our lives where we expect immunity
129.
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from the focused attention of others is no cultural, or biological, universal. But given a particular culture where these expected areas of
immunity exist, it is easy to see why the failure to honor this immunity
counts as an attack on the victim's moral core.
Finally, understanding privacy violations as egregious instances of disrespect that strike at the core of an individual's basic
dignity allows us to see how these insults can be so offensive, even
though the person loses so little. The legislators in the state of Oregon
a few years back floated the idea of requiring all state employees, including university professors, to submit to random drug tests as a
condition of employment. No doubt, some of my colleagues had something to hide. Their lifestyles were potentially threatened. Their loss
of privacy was going to result in a tangible personal loss, their job, or
perhaps their chosen form of recreation. For most of us on the faculty,
however, the days were long past when drug tests would disclose anything incriminating. Nevertheless, we all felt profoundly offended by
the proposed policy. How dare the state, our bosses, put us in a position of having to prove our innocence? We felt that the contents of our
bodily fluids were an extremely intimate area of our person where we
were entitled to immunity from the focused attention of others. Most
of us were troubled by this misguided potential policy, not because we
had something to hide, but precisely because we were honest, hardworking, state employees, who felt that our employers owed us trust
and respect.
To violate a person's privacy, to illegitimately focus attention on
protected areas of their lives, is to show them great personal disrespect. It is to insult them, and in extreme cases, it is to subject them to
a form of assault. These violations often produce great personal pain.
It is not the pain that makes them wrong from the backward-looking
perspective; rather it is because the violations are so clearly wrong,
that the victims often feel pain. Privacy conventions establish a kind
of trust between people. Failing to respect these conventions are,
therefore, a breaking of trust or a kind of cheating. The voyeur, the
paparazzi, the causal snoop, and the unscrupulous legal official, are
engaged in an offensive form of injustice. Like all forms of moral offense, the backward-looking perspective seeks some way of redressing
this past injustice. Of course, the sad truth is that contemporary
means of addressing these past violations of personal privacy under
American law -jail, civil damages, the exclusionary rule, et cetera are all imperfect devices of rectifying the insult and assault that victims have experienced.

